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Abstract 
Mission critical TCP-based services create a demand for robust and fault tolerant TCP 
communication. Sense Intellifield monitors drill operations on rig sites offshore. Critical 
TCP-based services need to be available 24 hours, 7 days a week, and the service 
providers need to tolerate server failure. 
 
How to make TCP robust and fault tolerant without modifying existing infrastructure like 
existing client/server applications, services, TCP stacks, kernels, or operating systems is 
the motivation of this thesis. 
 
We present a new middleware approach, first of its kind, to allow TCP-based services to 
survive server failure by migrating TCP connections from failed servers to replicated 
surviving servers. The approach is based on a proxy technique, which requires 
modifications to existing infrastructure. Our unique middleware approach is simple, 
practical, and can be built into existing infrastructure without modifying it. A middleware 
approach has never been used to implement the proxy based technique. 
 
Experiments for validation of functionality and measurement of performance of the 
middleware prototype are conducted. The results show that our technique adds significant 
robustness and fault tolerance to TCP, without modifying existing infrastructure. 
 
One of the consequences of using a middleware to make TCP communication robust and 
fault tolerant is added latency. Another consequence is that TCP communication can 
survive server failure, and mask it. Companies providing robust and fault tolerant TCP, is 
no longer dependant of third party hardware and/or software. By implementing our 
solution, they can gain economical advantages. 
 
A main focus of this report is to present a prototype that demonstrates our technique and 
middleware approach. We present relevant background theory which has lead to the 
design architecture of a middleware approach to make TCP communication fault tolerant. 
Finally we conduct experiments to uncover the feasibility and performance of the 
prototype, followed by a discussion and conclusion. 
 
Index Terms: Network reliability, TCP migration, Continuity of service, Middleware, 
Fault tolerance and failure masking. 
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1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will give an introduction to how a middleware can be used to add 
significant robustness and fault tolerance to TCP. In section 1.1 we give a brief 
overview of the need for robust and fault tolerant TCP. In section 1.2 we present a 
real case where there is a lack of robustness and fault tolerance, including a 
description of requirements to possible solutions. In section 1.3 we give an overview 
of related work to add robustness and fault tolerance to TCP-based services. In 
section 1.4 we outline the final thesis definition to the problem we will solve. In 
section 1.5 we give an overview of our work, followed by section 1.6 which we give 
an outline of this report. 
1.1  Background 
Businesses around the globe are becoming more dependent of network services than ever 
before. Several TCP/IP-based services are mission-critical for these businesses and the 
safety of their employees. The need for continuous information flow and “round a clock” 
operation has arisen. High availability, by failover protection of TCP-based services, is 
the key issue to address continuous information flow and “round a clock” operation. 
 
Today, numerous protocols for data communication like the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) ensures reliable and efficient client to server communication [1]. TCP 
ensures delivery of packets unless a client, server, or network fails.  
 
To prevent that a client, server, or network becomes a single point of failure, replication 
and redundancy is used. 
 
Sense Intellifield has developed a system, SiteCom® Rig, for acquiring, distributing and 
managing rig site data. This involves transferring real-time and historical data between 
onshore and offshore drill- and well sites, onshore control centers, headquarter offices, 
remote export sites, etc. 
 
The information flow is mission-critical for the safety and efficiency of drilling 
operations. It is therefore a high demand for the reliability and availability of the 
SiteCom® Rig services. 
1.2  Sense Intellifield’s service architecture 
Sense Intellifield monitors several critical components during drilling operations.  One of 
Sense’s products, SiteCom® Rig, is used at well sites either onshore or offshore. Various 
drilling systems push their data to the SiteCom® Rig system which in turn stores data 
and distributes data in real-time to any number of visualization and monitoring 
applications. A separate alarm system is deployed to acquire information from the well 
site SiteCom® Rig system and analyze the data. If any abnormality is detected, alarms 
are generated and sent to emergency personnel. This information flow is critical for the 
safety and efficiency of drilling operations. 
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Fault tolerance is a key ingredient for continuous (24/7) operation and to ensure high 
availability for continuous information flow. Sense Intellifield has ensured fault tolerance 
by using load balancing and server redundancy. The SiteCom® Rig system is replicated 
and a load balancer redirects incoming requests. The architecture is shown in the 
following figure: 
 
 
Figure 1: Sense's SiteCom® architecture 
 
If a server halts due to failure, incoming requests are redirected to the backup SiteCom® 
Rig server. Established connections to the faulty server are broken and clients have to 
reconnect to the backup. The SiteCom® Rig servers are unavailable for a few seconds, 
due to the time the load balancer uses to detect failure and the time the backup server 
currently requires to initialize the services the primary server was providing. During this 
downtime, some information may be lost, but this loss is not critical. 
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The SiteCom® Rig server is crash-failure tolerant by redundancy and provides high 
availability to its TCP/IP based services. The solution is N-1 crash-failure tolerant, where 
N is the number of replicated server nodes. The load balancer is very reliable, but is still a 
single point of failure. It has the option of being replicated as well, ruling out the single 
point of failure.  
 
However one of the important problems with the current architecture is that this solution 
is very expensive and it does not mask faults completely. If a server node fails, 
connections break. The client connected will detect the failure and may attempt to 
reconnect, but not all clients have an auto-reconnect feature. Some clients might fail due 
to a broken connection. This architecture do not migrate existing TCP connections to 
surviving replicated server nodes, and is therefore unable to mask failure. 
 
Sense Intellifield monitor several drill sites and has to introduce a SiteCom® Rig system, 
as seen in Figure 1, at each rig. The solution used today illustrated in Figure 1 is too 
expensive. The F5 load balancer has a marked value of about 100000 NOK1, and it has to 
come in pairs to rule out the load balancer as a single point of failure.  
 
Sense has developed their services and server applications with the Microsoft .Net 
service architecture, which only runs on the Microsoft Windows operating system. To use 
this operating system, licenses have to be acquired. To limit the costs of acquiring 
expensive licenses, Sense Intellifield has decided to limit the number of servers to the 
minimum. Two are needed to rule out a single point of failure. 
 
Sense Intellifield wants a solution consisting of two servers running on Microsoft 
Windows operating system. The servers have to be connected to standard network node 
like a hub or a switch to cut expenses and should not be dependant of third party load 
balancers or “black boxes”. There is a need for a solution that does not require 
modifications to operating systems. 
1.3  Related work 
Our primary motivation is to provide a tool that enhances reliability, which can be 
simply attached to existing infrastructure without making any modifications to the 
server or the client. In addition, no modifications shall be applied to any operating 
systems, TCP/IP stacks, applications, services, or kernels. 
 
Today, there are several theoretical, commercial, and open source approaches to enhance 
the reliability of TCP and the availability of TCP-based services. Generally, the proposed 
solutions are tailored for specific purposes and they are not general. Most of the solutions 
are dependant of specific operating systems, third party hardware, or tailored 
applications. 
 
There are many solutions that offer efficient TCP connection failover in clusters [47]. 
These solutions generally organize servers in a front-end and backend. The front-end 
                                                 
1 Marked value and currency per 20 May 2004 
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usually is a server functioning as a coordinator. The backend is a server cluster consisting 
of replicated services. The coordinator distributes incoming requests to the cluster. If a 
server in the cluster fails, the coordinator migrate connections to surviving servers in the 
cluster. The failure is completely transparent to the clients, by introducing a new 
transport layer. By using a coordinator, one is vulnerable to single point of failure. This 
solution requires at least three servers, and server side applications and services have to 
be modified. This solution does not comply with the requirements of not modifying 
existing infrastructure, and having two servers as the maximum amount of machines. 
 
A similar approach is used by fine-grained failover using connection migration [48], 
complies with the requirement of only having two servers, ensuring fault-tolerant and 
robust to TCP. The difference in this approach is that both servers have the same IP 
address and uses no coordinator, ruling out a single point of failure. The drawback is that 
the solution requires modifications to kernels in the operating system. 
 
A solution complying with the requirement of only having two servers, ensuring fault-
tolerant and robust to TCP, is called ST-TCP (Server fault-Tolerant TCP) [49]. The 
solution is based on an active backup server taping the Ethernet for information about the 
primary server’s TCP state. This solution requires modification of the server side 
applications and kernels. 
 
A different solution addresses link failures by adding a session layer protocol on top of 
TCP [50]. The solution is interesting due to its platform independence, link failure 
handling and low overhead (adding only 10% latency). If a link is broken, the session 
layer prevents the TCP connections from timing out. If the link is reestablished, the 
connection persists. The drawback is that this solution does not handle server failure. 
 
There are not many theoretical solutions today that enhance the reliability and availability 
of TCP-based services without adding expensive hardware, and modifying client/server 
applications, operating systems, TCP/IP stacks, or kernels. Extensive search has currently 
revealed only two papers offering a solution to this problem; Jeebs and its extension 
Secure Jeebs [39, 40].  
 
Jeebs is a client-transparent TCP migration system. It offers high availability by 
migrating connections from a failed server to a backup server. The Jeebs implementation 
consists of placing a “black box” on the server’s subnet to monitor all TCP connections 
for the specified server host and services, detect loss of service, and recover TCP 
connection before clients’ TCP stacks are aware of any difficulty. The system recovers 
from all combinations of Linux/Windows clients/servers, and has demonstrated seamless 
operation across server failures of many services, including HTTP, Telnet, SMTP and 
FTP. Jeebs can invoke a system call to place TCP state information (not application state) 
onto pristine sockets during connection recovery [39]. Note that this requires kernel 
modifications on the recovery system, ruling out this solution as applicable to Microsoft 
Windows or Mac operating systems. The Jeebs system requires the use of three servers; a 
primary server and a backup server, and a monitor/recovery server referred to as the 
“black box”. 
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Secure Jeebs is a more advanced version of Jeebs. Secure Jeebs is based on Jeebs’s 
client-transparent TCP migration techniques. It offers a migration system which migrate 
secure TCP-based services like SSH and HTTPS [40]. 
 
There are several commercial and open source solutions that enhance the reliability of 
TCP and the availability of TCP-based services. The solutions presented are mainly load 
balancers or modified servers enhancing reliable TCP. 
 
Load balancing is a service that distributes load to a cluster of servers. This service is 
provided either in a hierarchical group or in a flat group (see chapter 3.2.1 for further 
details). Load balancing also provides higher availability by forwarding incoming request 
to available servers and services. If a server fails, connections are lost. But if clients try to 
reconnect, they will be forwarded to another available server in the cluster. These 
solutions do not provide connection migration transparent to the client, but ensures 
successful reconnection.  
 
The BIG-IP® LoadBalancer Limited 520 is an example of a hierarchical load balancer, 
which is widely used in the commercial sector today [45]. Sense Intellifield is an example 
of a company that use a this kind of load balancer to increase the availability of their 
services. 
 
Microsoft 2000 Server and Microsoft 2003 provides Network load balancing in their 
operating systems [46]. The servers in this solution are organized in flat groups (see 
chapter 3.2.1 for further details). The availability of web services is increased by 
distributing incoming request between the servers in the cluster. The members of the 
cluster operate on two IP addresses; one unique and one common virtual IP for the entire 
cluster. But if a server fails, handling a TCP connection, the failure is not transparent to 
the client. The client has to issue a reconnect to continue. Only HTTP failure is 
transparent. A single point of failure is detected in the documentation of the MS load 
balancer. A synchronization process is executed from a synchronization disc which is 
passed around as a token between the servers in the cluster. If the server containing the 
synchronization disc (token) crashes, the whole cluster fails. 
 
The modified server solutions include modifications of existing open source operating 
systems, which are not applicable with Microsoft Windows, and Mac operating systems 
and applications. These solutions are platform dependant and not general. The High-
Availability Linux Project is an example [44]. 
1.4  Thesis definition 
The thesis provides a design for a fault tolerant, failure masking and replicated 
middleware for (N-1)-way failover in a cluster with N replicated server nodes. The 
middleware will focus on migrating open connections from a failed server node to 
surviving server nodes without breaking the connections with the clients. The final 
definition of the project is: 
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The students will design a middleware for migrating TCP connections, from a 
failing primary server to a replicated backup server, without breaking the 
connections. The migration will be completely transparent to the client and 
thus the failure is masked. 
 
The thesis title is: 
 
Middleware for Transparent TCP Connection Migration 
 
The thesis subtitle is: 
 
Masking Faulty TCP-based Services. 
 
The following requirement is given: 
 
The IP-stack must not be modified and there should be no modifications to the 
client or server application. 
 
And finally: 
 
If possible, a prototype will be made, demonstrating some of the concepts involved. 
1.5  Our work 
We will present a new concept of a middleware approach to enhance the 
availability and robustness of TCP-based services. Our concept is unique because 
it does not require any modifications to existing infrastructure. This means that no 
operating system, client/server applications, services, TCP/IP stacks, or kernels 
has to be modified. The middleware can simply be introduced to an existing 
architecture and increase the robustness and availability of TCP-based services. 
 
Our concept is based on an existing proxy technique [39]. The technique was introduced 
in a system called Jeebs, but it was not implemented as a middleware and it required 
modifications to Linux kernels. In other words, the proxy technique requires 
modifications to existing infrastructure. A middleware approach implementing the proxy 
technique has never been done. 
 
We also present a prototype solution for fault tolerant TCP, which demonstrates our 
concept. The solution is a middleware application, installed as a black box on the backup 
server on the local area network (LAN). 
 
The prototype has to be true to the internet philosophy, where the intelligence is supposed 
to be implemented in the computers, while keeping the network nodes as dumb as 
possible. We want to regard the prototype as a network node, even though it is a 
middleware running on a backup server. Therefore it is important to let the TCP/IP stack 
take care of the communication as much as possible. This way we can rely on the 
transmission control protocol to provide reliable client to server communication. The 
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prototype will add robustness to TCP by increasing the availability of the TCP-based 
services residing on the server. 
 
If the concept is realized by the prototype it could in practice, or at least in principle, 
make Sense Intellifield’s SiteCom® Rig system less dependant of third party load 
balancer, as seen in Figure 1. 
 
The intention is that if our prototype is introduced to the SiteCom® Rig system, the third 
party BIG-IP® LoadBalancer Limited 520 can replaced by a pair of hubs or switches with 
tapping capability. The prototype can simply be installed on the backup server, as seen 
below in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Supplement Sense's SiteCom® architecture with a middleware 
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The intention of our solution is to simply install a middleware to existing infrastructure 
without being dependant of expensive third party devices, or being dependant to specific 
operating systems. The concept of our middleware prototype is to simply install a 
platform independent middleware to enhance the reliability, robustness and availability of 
TCP and TCP-based services. 
1.6  Report outline 
The outline of this report is as follows; Chapter 2 contains a “need to know” presentation 
of the Transmission Control Protocol. It presents the basic of TCP, allowing the reader to 
keep track of the terminologies in the report. In chapter 3 and 4 we present relevant 
theory about replication and fault tolerance. Keep in mind that in chapter 2, 3, and 4 we 
give a brief overview of theory to give the reader a foundation to comprehend the 
contents of chapter 5. In chapter 5 we describe the architecture of the middleware 
prototype for transparent TCP connection migration which masks faulty TCP-based 
services. The modules and algorithms are described in this chapter. In chapter 6 we 
present the results of conducted experiments on the prototype, followed by a discussion 
of the results in chapter 7. The conclusion of the thesis is presented in the last and final 
chapter 8. The source code for the prototype is presented in Appendix A [51]. 
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2 The Transmission Control Protocol 
In this chapter we give a general overview of the transmission control protocol [1]. 
In chapter 5 an algorithm, translating sequence and acknowledgement numbers from 
a TCP connection to another, is presented. In this chapter we try to give the reader 
tools to comprehend the architecture of the prototype presented in this report. The 
literature in this chapter is a summary of the TCP RFC [1] and general computer 
engineering curriculum [36]. 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter will give an overview of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and a 
more in depth view of the following issues; Connection establishment, connection 
termination, sequence and acknowledgement numbers, and the sliding window protocol. 
These subjects are especially important to understand this report. 
 
The TCP protocol is on top of the IP protocol and below the application protocols, on the 
transport layer, seen in Figure 3. The TCP protocol has several purposes; creating 
process-to-process communication, creating flow and error control, and managing the 
connection setup and termination mechanisms [36]. 
 
 
Figure 3: ISO 5 layer model 
 
Each process is uniquely identified by the IP address and a port number. Where the IP 
address identifies a specific host on the internet, and the port number identifies a specific 
process on a host. This makes it possible to map a TCP connection to an application 
process.  
 
The flow and error control is achieved through a combination of acknowledge packets, 
time-out and retransmission. 
2.2  The TCP/IP data units 
A data unit, when we are talking about the Internet Protocol (IP), is called a packet. 
When two hosts communicate over the internet, using the IP protocol, they need an IP 
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address each. The address is assigned by their internet service provider. The data sent 
over the internet will then be divided into small packets of data and a header is added. 
This header contains information which the routers on the internet use to forward the 
packets to the right destination. The header also contains a checksum and other 
information. The checksum is an ones complement checksum which functions as a 
simple error detection mechanism for the IP packets. 
 
The IP packets are not ordered, and this creates a problem when you want to send data 
over the internet with the IP protocol, because the packets can arrive in a different order 
than they were sent in. This is where the TCP protocol comes in. TCP creates a virtual 
connection over the IP protocol using sequence and acknowledgment numbers. In 
addition TCP contains port numbers which makes it possible to identify the two 
communicating processes on the hosts. The data unit used by the TCP protocol is called a 
segment. The segment has a header containing the sequence and acknowledgment 
numbers, port numbers, flags, and other information. The TCP segment is again wrapped 
in an IP packet before it is sent over the internet to the remote host. 
2.3  Segmentation and acknowledgement 
TCP is a connection-oriented protocol, and the protocol is responsible for segmenting the 
data stream received from the higher layers. This must be done in order for the TCP layer 
to send the data stream over the packet switched IP network. The segments have to be 
numbered in order for the TCP layer at the receiving end to be able to put the stream back 
together again. 
 
The sequence numbers are selected starting at a cryptographically secure random number. 
This is called the initial sequence number or ISN. The sequence number is the first bye 
carried in the segment. If the ISN was 1 in the first segment which contained 1000 bytes 
of data, the sequence number of the next segment will be 1001. 
 
On the receiving end the TCP layer has the responsibility for putting together the 
segments in a correct order and with error free segments. TCP use one buffer to send 
packets and one to receive packets. The buffers are where the implementation of the flow 
and error control mechanisms is implemented. The receiver responds to the sender by 
sending an acknowledgement. 
 
An acknowledgement is a receipt to the sender. The receipt confirms the proper reception 
of all segments up to some point. The acknowledgement indicates the next byte expected 
from the sender, and the acknowledgement number can also be used to request a 
retransmit of a lost segment. The acknowledgement number is cumulative, which means 
that adding one to the last byte received. This is then the acknowledgement number [36]. 
 
Because a TCP connection is a full duplex connection, the acknowledgement can be 
piggybacked with next segment going out. This way the overhead caused by sending 
acknowledgement packages is minimal. 
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2.4  Connection establishment and termination 
When a computer wants to establish a new TCP connection this process is called the 
Three-way handshake, and connection termination is performed through a process called 
the Four-way handshake. Both the connection establishment and connection termination 
are controlled by setting the bits in the flags field of the TCP header. The flags are URG, 
ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, and FIN. The SYN flag is used to initiate a TCP connection, 
synchronizing the sequence numbers during connection establishment. The ACK flag 
confirms the proper reception of a segment, or all segment up to some point. The ACK 
flag indicates that the acknowledgment field in the TCP header is valid. The PSH flag 
indicates that the segment contains data, and not just the header. FIN indicates to the 
receiver that the remote host wants to terminate the connection, with the four way 
handshake. This is similar to the RST flag which causes the TCP connection to be 
aborted with out performing the four way handshake. Finally we have the URG flag, 
which is not in use anymore.  
 
TCP supports full duplex communication. As a result of this, the sender has to get a 
confirmation from the receiver after a connection setup, and before any data can be sent. 
2.4.1 Three-way handshake 
The connection establishment in TCP is done through a three-way handshake, as seen in 
Figure 1. The connection establishment is initiated from a client, but before the client can 
connect to another host, the server, it has to start accepting connections on a port. This is 
called passive open. When the client tries to connect, it requests an active open. If the 
server accepts the connection from the client the three-way handshake begins [36]. 
 
 
Figure 4: Three-way handshake 
 
The client sends the first segment, with the SYN flag set. This segment contains 
information about the source and destination port numbers. These identify which 
processes will be communicating. The segment also contains the clients initial sequence 
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number, which is used for numbering the segments from the client. This segment may 
also define the max segment size here. This segment can be seen in Figure 4, marked as 
Segment 1. 
 
Secondly, the server sends a segment with the SYN+ACK flags set. This segment 
acknowledges the first segment from the client, and is used as the initialization segment 
for the server. This segment contains the client window size, and may also define the 
server’s maximum segment size and the window scale factor. The segment sequence 
number is initiated with the servers initial sequence number. This segment is marked 
Segment 2 in Figure 4. 
 
Thirdly, the client sends a segment with the ACK flag set. With this segment the client 
acknowledges the receipt of the previous segment. The segment also defines the server 
window size. This segment may contain data from the client to the server. When this 
segment is received the three-way handshake is complete. This segment is marked 
Segment 3 in Figure 4. 
2.4.2 Four-way handshake 
Connection termination can be initiated both from the client and the server side, as seen 
in Figure 5. When one end close the connection the other end can continue to send data 
until it decide to close the connection as well. This means we have to use a four-way 
handshake to close the connection in both directions [36]. 
 
 
Figure 5: Four-way handshake 
 
First, if we assume the connection termination is initiated by the client, the client sends a 
segment with the FIN flag set, as seen in Figure 5 (Segment 1). This is called an active 
close [36]. 
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Secondly the server acknowledges the receipt of the previous segment with a segment 
where the ACK flag is set (Segment 2). The acknowledgement number is one plus the 
sequence number of the previous segment. When the client receives this packet it closes 
the connection from the client to the server, while the connection from the server to the 
client is kept open until the server request a connection termination. 
 
When the server is finished sending all the data, the third step is initiated. The server 
sends a segment with the FIN flag set to the client (Segment 3). This is called a passive 
close [36]. 
 
In the last step the client sends a segment to the server with the ACK flag set (Segment 
4), and the acknowledgement number set to one plus the sequence number of the FIN 
segment received from the server. This completes the four-way handshake and the 
connection is now terminated in both directions. 
2.4.3 Reset 
In addition to the four-way handshake, the connection may also be reset. This is not a 
graceful connection termination, and is used when some kind of abnormality occurs, or 
when one end of the connection wishes to abort the connection. A connection reset is 
carried out when one end of the connection send a segment with the RST flag set. 
2.5  Sliding Window Protocol 
TCP provide flow and error control trough a mechanism called the Sliding Window 
Protocol. This protocol control how much data can be sent before an acknowledgement is 
received, and help us avoid network congestion. This protocol is implemented at the 
sender and the receiver. A window is a portion of the send or receive buffer. At the 
receiving side the TCP protocol implements the protocol to only accept TCP segments 
when they lie within the current window. The window slide forward when it has received 
the lower bytes in the buffer correctly. And in this way start to accept higher bytes. An 
acknowledgement segment is sent when the receiver has verified the correct reception of 
a segment. If the sender doesn’t receive the acknowledgement within a predefined time, a 
retransmission is triggered. Eventually the segments will be received or a connection 
reset is performed. The sender and receiver are able to inform each other of the window 
size, making it possible to throttle the send/receive speed.  
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3 FAULT TOLERANCE 
In this chapter we give a general overview of common fault tolerance terms. In this 
chapter we try to give the reader tools to comprehend the concept of the middleware 
approach to fault tolerant TCP-based services, which is presented in this report. The 
literature in this chapter is a summary of basic fault tolerance in distributed systems, 
which can be found in general computer science curriculum [37]. 
3.1  Background 
It is important to design distributed systems in such a way that it can automatically 
recover from partial failures without seriously affecting the overall performance. When 
failures occur, the distributed system should be able to operate acceptable while repairs 
are being made. This is called process resilience. Reliable multicasting guarantees that 
message transmission to a collection of processes is executed successfully. It is necessary 
to keep processes synchronized. To recover from failures, one can save states to recover 
back to a functional state. 
 
There are four basic terms in fault tolerance, called dependability: availability, reliability, 
safety and maintainability [2]. 
 
Availability means that services are available to the users at any given time.  
 
Reliability defines the uptime of a system. Safety means that failure does not lead 
to catastrophic events.  
 
Maintainability defines how easy a failed system can be repaired. 
 
All kinds of failure may occur, but they can be classified. The following schema is 
describes different classes of failure [3, 4]: 
 
Type of failure Description 
Crash failure A server halts, but is working correctly until it halts. 
Omission failure 
Receive omission 
Send omission 
A server fails to respond to incoming requests 
A server fails to receive incoming messages 
A server  fails to send messages 
Timing failure A server’s response lies outside the specified time interval 
Response failure 
Value failure 
State transition failure 
A server’s response is incorrect 
The value of the response is wrong 
The server deviates from the correct flow of control 
Arbitrary failure A server may produce arbitrary responses at arbitrary times. 
 
To make a system fault tolerant, the best thing to do is to hide the occurrence of failures 
from other processes. The key technique for masking faults is to use redundancy. Three 
kinds are possible: information redundancy, time redundancy, and physical redundancy 
[5].  Hamming code is an example of information redundancy. Extra information is added 
to handle noise. Transactions are an example of time redundancy. If a transaction aborts, 
it is redone.  
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Physical redundancy can be done in both hardware and software. If some crash, others 
resume the operations. TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy) is an example presented in 
Figure 6. Let us consider A, B, and C as network nodes. If A sends a message to C, it has 
to go through B (a). If B fails, A and C cannot communicate. A voter has three input 
channels, and needs two incoming messages to generate an output (b). 
 
 
Figure 6: Triple modular redundancy 
3.2  Process Resilience 
Process resilience means protection against process failures in distributed systems. 
Processes can be organized into groups. When a message is sent to the group itself, all 
members of the group receive it [6]. If a process fails, someone else in the group can take 
over. 
3.2.1 Flat Groups versus Hierarchical Groups 
The flat group, of processes, has no single point of failure, but decisions take more time. 
The hierarchical group has a coordinator and therefore a single point of failure. The 
advantage is that decision making is more efficient, and the coordinator can dedicate 
tasks to processes that are more suited for the specific task. 
3.2.2 Failure Masking and Replication 
Having a group of identical processes allows us to mask one or more faulty processes in 
that group. This way one can replace a single (vulnerable) process with a (fault tolerant) 
group. There are two ways to approach such replication: by means of primary-based 
protocols, or through replicated-write protocols [37]. Primary-based replication is a 
hierarchical group of processes with a primary coordinator. The coordinator controls all 
write operations to the other processes (primary-backup protocol).  Replicated-write 
protocols are organized in flat groups. There is no single point of failure.  This protocol 
is used in the form of active replication [7] and quorum-based protocols [8, 9]. To 
implement active replication, totally-ordered multicasting is needed [10]. A system is 
said to be k fault tolerant if it can survive faults in k components and still meet its 
specifications. Having k + 1 processes is enough to provide k fault tolerance. 
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3.2.3 Agreement in Faulty Systems 
This has to be taken in account if processes lie about their result. It takes 2k + 1 processes 
to be k fault tolerant. This problem is called Byzantine generals problem. We will not 
describe this in further details, because this does not apply to our case. 
3.3  Reliable Client-Server Communication 
A communication channel may exhibit crash, omission, timing and arbitrary failures. 
Arbitrary failures may occur in the form of duplicate messages, resulting from the fact 
that in a computer network messages may be buffered for a relatively long time, and are 
reinjected into the network after the original sender has already issued a retransmission 
[11]. 
3.3.1 Point-to-Point Communication 
This is done by using a reliable transport protocol, such as TCP. TCP masks errors and 
retransmits messages. Only crash failures are not masked. 
3.3.2 RPC Semantics in Presence of Failures 
There are five classes of failures that can occur in RPC systems, as follows: 
1. The client is unable to locate the server. 
2. The request message from the client to the server is lost. 
3. The server crashes after receiving a request. 
4. The reply message from the server to the client is lost. 
5. The client crashes after sending a request. 
The solutions from these failures are presented, as follows: 
 
 
1. Client Cannot Locate the Server 
Having the error raise an exception can prevent crashes. 
 
2. Lost Request Messages 
If a request message is truly lost, a timer can be used to retransmit the message. If no 
replies arrive at the client, error 1 occurs. If two identical requests arrive at the server, 
error 4 occurs. The problem with this solution is that the client does not know if the 
server is slow or if the message was lost. 
 
3. Server Crashes 
There are several combinations of server crashes. The following scenario describes these 
combinations of failure: A client sends a request for printing some text to a server. The 
server crashes. A table containing the crash combinations and solutions for these errors is 
presented, as follows: 
 
    M =  Completion message 
    P = Print the text 
    C =  Crash 
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Server Client 
Strategy M → P Strategy P → M 
Reissue strategy MPC MC(P) C(MP) PMC PC(M) C(MP) 
Always DUP OK OK DUP DUP DUP 
Never DUP ZERO ZERO OK OK ZERO 
Only when 
ACKed 
DUP OK ZERO DUP OK ZERO 
Only when not 
ACKed 
 
OK ZERO OK OK DUP OK 
 
OK = Text is printed once 
DUP = Text is printed twice 
ZERO = Text is not printed at all 
 
4. Lost Reply Messages 
If a reply message is lost the client times out because no ACK is received. The client will 
then retransmit the request, thinking the request message was lost. The server might be 
slow and receive both the original request message and the retransmitted one. To avoid 
answering both messages, sequence number can distinguish original messages from 
retransmitted ones. 
 
5. Client Crashes 
There are several problems with a client crashing after it has sent a message. See page 
380 for further details [37]. This problem does not apply to our case. 
3.4  Reliable Group Communication 
It is very important to guarantee reliable multicasting. All members in a process group 
must receive the message. 
3.4.1 Basic Reliable-Multicasting Schemes 
During multicasts, a receiver can miss a message. By sequencing the multicast messages 
the receiver can detect lost messages. If the last received message is 23 and it receives 
message 25, it can acknowledge to the sender that it has missed message 24. If the sender 
has a history buffer of all sent messages, it can simply retransmit message 24 [12]. One 
problem with the reliable multicast scheme is that it cannot support large number of 
receivers. 
3.4.2 Scalability in Reliable Multicasting 
If only negative ACKs are returned to the sender, this scheme can handle more clients 
than the solution represented above [13]. The problem is that the sender of multicast 
messages has to store all messages in a history buffer. The buffer has to delete messages 
so it will not be overflowed. Some clients might not receive certain messages at all. 
Different schemes are compared [14]. 
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A nonhierarchical feedback control is a scalable solution that tries to reduce the 
number of feedback messages that are returned to the sender. The Scalable Reliable 
Multicast (SRM) [15] is based on feedback suppression. See pages 383-385 for further 
details. 
 
A hierarchical feedback control is used to achieve scalability for very large groups. It 
divides a network in to smaller groups, so that a coordinator in each group can use any 
reliable multicast schemes to retransmit messages in their sub groups [16]. The multicast 
messages are only sent to the coordinators. 
3.4.3 Atomic Multicast 
Atomic multicast is supposed to guarantee that a message is delivered to either all 
processes or to none at all. Generally it is also required that all messages are delivered in 
the same order to all processes. 
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4 CONSISTENCY AND REPLICATION 
In this chapter we give a general overview of common terms regarding consistency 
and replication. The literature in this chapter is a summary of theory on consistency 
and replication in distributed systems, which can be found in general computer 
science curriculum [37]. It is recommended to have basic knowledge about the topic, 
when we describe Sense’s SiteCom and SiteCom® Rig architecture. For example, as 
we described in chapter 1.2 , a primary and backup server is replicated to tolerate 
failure, and the data sources are being kept consistent by Oracle applications. 
4.1  Background 
Reliability and performance are the primary reasons for replication. A reliability 
example: imagine there are three copies of a database, and every insert, update and select 
query is performed on each copy. We can safeguard ourselves against a single, failing 
insert or update operation, by considering the value that is returned by at least two copies 
as being the correct one. 
4.2  Synchronous Replication 
A consistency type called synchronous replication provides tight consistency [17]. The 
key idea is to update all replicas in one single atomic operation or transaction. If one 
replica is updated, all replicas should be updated before any new operations takes place. 
Difficulties arise because all replicas have to be synchronized and an agreement has to be 
made to decide when exactly an update has to be performed locally. The use of global 
ordering (Lamport’s timestamps) or a coordinator to assign such an order has to be 
included. The gain is a scalable and improved performance solution, but the cost is global 
synchronization that affects the performance. 
4.3  Data-centric Consistency Models 
Traditionally, consistency has always been discussed in the context of read and write 
operations on shared data, available by means of (distributed) shared memory, a 
(distributed) shared database, or a (distributed) file system [37]. A broader term can be 
used: data store. It can be physically distributed across multiple machines. Copies or 
replicas of the data store can be accessed by different processes. A process can do it 
locally or nearby. 
4.3.1 Strict Consistency 
Basic idea: Any read on data item x returns a value corresponding to the result of the 
most recent write on x. This model assumes the existence of absolute global time and is 
therefore impossible to implement. 
4.3.2 Linearizability Consistency 
The closest you get to strict consistency. A global available clock is used to order the 
operations with timestamps [18]. Every operation is also executed in the sequential order. 
The drawbacks are loosely synchronized clocks that will not guarantee absolute time 
ordering and the expensive implementation [19]. 
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4.3.3 Sequential Consistency 
Basic idea of sequential consistency: The result of any execution is the same as if the 
(read and write) operations by all processes in the data store where executed in some 
sequential order and the operations of each individual process appear in this sequence in 
the order specified by its program [20]. The sequence of write operations is not ordered 
in absolute global time, but every processor reads the same write sequence. Every read is 
guarantied to read the most resent write. Easy to implement (widely used), but poor 
performance.  
4.3.4 Causal Consistency 
Causal related events are being kept consistent [21]. For example: A causal related write 
has to be read by all other processes enforcing consistency. Concurrent writes are 
operations that are not causal related. These writes does not enforce consistency. No 
global order is implemented. To implement this consistency model, one needs to keep 
track of which processes have read which writes. One must also keep track of which 
operation is depended on which other operation. This can be implemented by the use of 
vector timestamps. 
4.3.5 FIFO Consistency 
All writes are concurrent. Only write operations from one process are ordered. This 
model is easy to implement and a process number and a sequence number for each write 
operation is necessary to ensure FIFO ordering for a processor’s write operations [22]. 
 
4.3.6 Weak Consistency 
This model uses synchronization variables to update replicas. When a process has 
accessed a critical section and performed write operations, all the replicas are 
synchronized. This model is most useful when isolated accesses to shared data are rare, 
with most accesses coming in clusters (many accesses in a short period, then none for a 
long time). One limits only the time when consistency holds, rather than limiting the form 
of consistency [23]. 
4.3.7 Release Consistency 
Eager release consistency uses two variables for synchronization: acquire and release 
[24]. When a process acquires data, the local data is brought up to date by reading other 
replicas. When a release is done, the local copy’s changes are being propagated to other 
replicas. If acquire and release occur in pairs, the result of any execution will be no 
different than a sequentially consistent data store. Operations on shared data are made 
atomic. In Eager release consistency no updates are propagated after a release [25]. 
Nothing happens when a release occurs. While acquiring, a process determines if it has 
all the data it needs. The result is reduced network traffic. 
4.3.8 Entry Consistency 
Entry consistency is similar to the release consistency model [26, 27]. The difference is 
that it requires each ordinary shared data item to be associated with some synchronization 
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variable such as a lock or barrier. This increases the amount of parallelism. Programming 
this model is more complicated and error prone. 
4.4  Client-centric Consistency Models 
Data stores exposed to a majority of read operations and few updates does not necessarily 
need strong consistency models. Since write-write conflicts are easy to resolve and most 
operations are read operations very weak consistency models are sufficient. Many 
inconsistencies can be hidden easily by applying eventual consistency. 
 
Eventual consistency is suited for data stores that tolerate a high degree of inconsistency. 
If no updates take place for a long time, all replicas will gradually become consistent. All 
replicas converge toward identical copies of each other. It is cheap to implement. This 
model works fine if clients always access the same replica. Problems occur when mobile 
clients access different replicas. Eventual consistency solves this problem. If a mobile 
process performs updates on one local copy and accesses another, all previous updates 
will be performed on the new local copy before further updates occur [28, 29]. 
4.4.1 Monotonic Reads 
This model quarantines that a client reading data x on one local copy L1, it will read the 
same result x or a more recent version of x on another local copy L2. This is ensured by 
propagating every update on L1 to L2 before the same client starts to work on L2.  
4.4.2 Monotonic Writes 
When a write is done on a local copy x, all preceding write operation on any copy of x is 
performed first. The local copy x is being brought up to date before any write operation is 
performed [29]. 
4.4.3 Read Your Writes 
A write operation is always completed before a successive read operation by the same 
process, no matter where that read operation takes place [30]. Solves problems, like for 
example, web-browsers not show updated pages. 
4.4.4 Writes Follow Reads 
Any successive write operation by a process on a data item x will be performed on a copy 
of x that is up to date with the value most recently read by that process [29]. 
4.5  Distribution Protocols 
Protocols for distributing updates to replicas will be discussed in this chapter. 
4.5.1 Replica Placement 
There are three main types of replica placement categories to be considered when placing 
replicas in a distributed system [31]. Permanent replicas are widely used in distribution 
of web sites [32] and databases [33, 34]. Some of these techniques are known as 
mirroring, shared-nothing strategies and federated databases. These techniques spread 
replicas on a limited number of machines. Server-Initiated replicas dynamically push 
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replicas close to clients to enhance performance [35]. Client-Initiated Replicas is used to 
improve access time by caching replicas at clients. They are responsible for managing the 
update of the replica. 
4.5.2 Update Propagation 
What should be propagated during updates? Three basic approaches: 1) Propagate only a 
notification of update, 2) Transfer data from one copy to another, and 3) Propagate the 
update operation to other copies. Issues with pull versus push protocols and unicasting 
versus multicasting is discussed on page 331-334 [37]. 
4.5.3 Epidemic Protocols 
This protocol, one assumes that all updates for a specific data item are initiated at a single 
server. Two methods are essential: anti-entropy and rumor spreading (gossiping). The 
anti-entropy method is very similar to disease spreading and uses either a push or pull to 
exchange updates, or push and pull. It is easy to spread updates and hard to delete copies.  
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5 MigWare architecture 
In these sections we give an overview of the MigWare middleware’s architecture. 
MigWare consists of four modules which we described in detail in this chapter. A 
detailed explanation of the algorithm used to recover TCP connection is also given. 
It explains how MigWare modifies the sequence and acknowledgment numbers in the 
TCP header. Some of the restrictions in the current implementation of MigWare are 
also described. The source code for the MigWare middleware prototype can be 
found in the appendix [51]. 
5.1  Overview 
MigWare is developed as a proof of concept study to demonstrate the feasibility of 
developing a middleware solution to recover and migrate TCP connections, and to 
measure its performance. An important premise for this middleware is to avoid 
modification to the TCP/IP stack. The architecture we have devised consists of four 
modules as seen in Figure 7, namely a Sniffer module, a Parser module, a Connection 
Tracker module, and a Monitor module. 
 
The Sniffer module has the responsibility of detecting all traffic on the local network and 
buffering this traffic in terms of raw packets. The Parser module processes the buffered 
raw packets in order to extract the data fields that are relevant for tracking TCP 
connections. Furthermore, packets that are not related to TCP traffic are thrown away for 
performance reasons. The extracted data fields are in turn passed to the Connection 
Tracker module. The Connection Tracker module maintains information about current 
TCP connections to the Primary Server based on the information provided by the Parser 
module.  In essence, the Connection Tracker module identifies which parsed packets 
belong to which TCP connection and updates the tracked state of the respective TCP 
connections accordingly.  
 
Independently of the other modules, the Monitor module monitors the Primary Server 
continuously in order to detect whether the server has crashed. When a crash is detected, 
the other modules are notified, so that they can take appropriate recovery actions. The 
purpose of these recovery actions is to migrate the TCP connections of the Primary 
Server to the Backup Server, based on the connection state maintained by the Connection 
Tracker module. 
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Figure 7: MigWare modules 
 
Our design is one of three possible designs patterns for a fault tolerant recovery system; 
Standalone, Integrated, and Proxy [39]. The design seen in Figure 7, which is used by 
MigWare, is based on the Proxy design. This design does not require any modification to 
the service we intend to replicate, and therefore no access to the source code is necessary.  
This design is implemented as a middleware, which translates packets to or from the 
client, and maps them to the new connection. While the primary server is running, the 
middleware is able to log the necessary TCP state information. When the primary server 
crashes, the middleware can act as a packet forwarder for the connections originally 
intended for the primary server. It pipelines packets from the client to the backup server. 
An example of this communication can be seen in Figure 8. In addition MigWare lets the 
TCP/IP-stack take care of the communication as much as possible. MigWare is true to the 
internet philosophy, where the intelligence is supposed to be implemented in the 
computers, while keeping the network nodes as dumb as possible. We regard MigWare as 
a network node, even though it is a middleware running on the backup server. 
 
The Standalone design uses two components. All the recovered connections are serviced 
by a standalone software application, which is a modified version of the standard service 
[39]. A standard unmodified service handles all the new connections to the service. This 
implementation requires two services running on the backup server, and access to the 
source code of the service. This might not be possible because the source code for a 
service might not be available. An implementation of the Standalone design might 
involve modification to the kernel and to the standard service. This would require access 
to the operating systems source code, in addition to the services source code, but might 
give the recovered connections a performance boost. An implementation without kernel 
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modifications would involve using a similar process as the one used by MigWare, which 
is described in detail in the following sections. 
 
The Integrated design relies on modifying the service to support recovery of connections, 
as well as accepting new connections. This might also involve modification of the client 
software, because the modifications to the service might require protocol update to 
support connection recovery [39].  This implementation requires only one service on the 
backup server, but access to the source code is required to modify the standard 
application to recover connections. An implementation of the Integrated design might 
involve modifications to the kernel and the service in much the same way as the 
Standalone design. The kernel modification would give the recovered connections a 
performance boost, but require access to the kernel source. This is the category in which 
we would place Jeebs [39], because all the connections to the server are serviced by one 
application. It could be argued, since Jeebs use an additional computer to monitor the 
TCP connections and replay the connection to the backup server when the primary fails, 
it fall into the Standalone category. The Integrated design can also be implemented 
without kernel modification, but this would involve using a similar process as the one 
used by MigWare. This process is described in detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 8: Sequence and acknowledgement number mapping 
 
In Figure 8, we can see how the client sends a packet with a sequence and 
acknowledgement number. MigWare detects this packet and converts the sequence and 
acknowledgement numbers based on the sequence and acknowledgement previously 
collected from the connection. In order to map the packets to the new connection, the IP 
addresses, port numbers, checksums, and MAC addresses need to be modified as well. It 
then sends the modified packet to the backup server. A connection uses a different 
sequence numbers in each direction. When a TCP connection is created, the sequence and 
acknowledgement numbers are randomly generated as discussed in the Transmission 
Control Protocol section. It is necessary to monitor the packets in both directions to 
successfully modify the packets in both directions. While MigWare monitors the primary 
server’s connections for these TCP/IP header fields, it is in the Normal state. The 
forwarding of packets, seen in Figure 8 is performed while in the Proxy state, seen in 
Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: MigWare state chart 
 
As seen in Figure 9, MigWare operates in three states. Normal state is when the primary 
server is running and no failure has been detected by MigWare. A problem can be when 
the primary server crashes, when a TCP service on the primary server crashes or when 
the primary server looses its network connection. In this state MigWare does not actively 
participate in the communication, but monitors the traffic between the primary server and 
the clients. 
 
The second state is the Recovery state. MigWare makes a transition to this state when a 
monitor reports a failure with the primary servers operation. When MigWare is in this 
state, all the connections to the primary server are recovered, but only those who have 
been detected. This involves setting up new connections, with similar properties, between 
MigWare and the backup server.  
 
When all the connections have been recovered, MigWare transitions to the third and final 
stage. In the Proxy stage, MigWare acts as a proxy server. All packets from the clients to 
the primary server are sniffed by MigWare and modified, before they are sent to the 
replicated service on the backup server. The same is true when the backup server is 
sending packets to MigWare. 
5.2  Sequence and Acknowledgement number algorithm 
While MigWare is in the Proxy state, it operates on two TCP connections for each 
recovered connection. MigWare monitors the initial crashed connection and forwards 
data to the new recovered connection between itself and the backup server. MigWare 
uses four key sequence numbers collected from the two connections three-way 
handshake, and from the last retransmission of the crashed connection. Using these four 
sequence numbers, it is possible to map a sequence and an acknowledgement number 
from the crashed TCP connection, to the new recovered TCP connection, from MigWare 
to the backup server. The same is possible in the reverse direction. 
 
While MigWare is running in Normal state, it continuously listens for TCP segments with 
the SYN flag set. This flag indicates a client wants to establish a new connection. When 
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MigWare detects a segment with the SYN flag sent to the primary server, a new 
connection object is created. A connection object is MigWare’s representation of a TCP 
connection between a client and the primary server. The primary server will reply, to the 
SYN segment, with a TCP segment with the SYN+ACK flags set, indicating that the 
server accepts the connection. Finally, the client sends a TCP segment with the ACK flag 
send, acknowledging the proper reception of the SYN+ACK segment. This sequence can 
be seen in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: A three-way handshake/connection establishment 
 
A new connection is created, and MigWare registers the initial sequence numbers in both 
directions. The source and destination IP addresses uniquely identifies a connection 
together with the source and destination port numbers. This is used as an identifier for 
that connection. 
 
MigWare also registers the MAC address where the segment originates from. This 
enables us to physically send the packet on the Ethernet, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The client continues to send packets on the connection, while MigWare keeps 
track of the last sequence and acknowledgement numbers. 
 
When MigWare detects a failure with the primary server, it enters the Recovery state, and 
the information previously collected is used. With the information collected and stored in 
the connection object, it is possible to construct a SYN segment. In Figure 11 below, we 
can see a scenario where a client is communicating with the primary server. MigWare 
detects the connection between the client and the primary server. 
 
In Figure 11 we can see how MigWare detects the connection establishment between the 
client and the primary server (1). This communication from the client is originally 
intended for the primary server, but it is also received by MigWare. The SYN+ACK 
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segment in the connection setup (1) is marked with a red label (MCS). This is a label for 
the sequence number this packet has, which is used later. 
 
The client continues to push data to the server, up to the point where the primary server 
stops responding (2), and the client starts to retransmit the packet. The sequence number 
of the last retransmit is labeled (CMS). MigWare will detect that the primary server has 
crashed, and transitions into the Recovery state. In (3) we can se how MigWare uses the 
CMS, also called MBS, to construct a SYN segment. The backup server does not 
communicate directly with MigWare. All packages sent from MigWare are addressed 
from the primary server, as discussed above. The SYN+ACK segment received from the 
backup (3) is labeled (BMS). Using the MBS and BMS MigWare is able to respond 
correctly with an ACK segment. MigWare has successfully recovered the connection, 
and is now ready to start transmitting the data segments (4) originally sent to the primary 
server. 
 
Using the four sequence numbers we have labeled MCS, CMS, MBS, and BMS we are 
able to calculate the difference between the sequence numbers on both TCP connections. 
One side is the TCP connection between the client and the primary server, which is 
mapped to the primary server to backup server connection. The formula for calculating 
these two differences is as follows: 
 
D1 = MBS – CMS 
D2 = BMS – MCS 
 
Using these two differences we are able to formulate four formulas for converting the 
sequence and acknowledgement numbers between the two TCP connections. The 
equations are as follows: 
 
ClientToBackupSeq = Seq + D1 
ClientToBackupAck = Ack + D2 
BackupToClientSeq = Seq – D2 
BackupToClientAck = Ack – D1 
 
Because the segment and acknowledgement numbers are 32bit long, the above equations 
need to take this into account. When the number becomes larger than 32bit the number 
starts at zero again. This is also the case when the number becomes less than zero, when 
the number wrap around to the maximum value represented by 32bit. 
 
For example if MigWare receive a segment from the client to the primary server, and 
want to map this segment to the primary server to backup server connection, we use the 
ClientToBackupSeq formula. In this formula the Seq is the original sequence number of 
the segment before we modify it. The same is done when converting the 
acknowledgement number, but using the ClientToBackupAck formula and the original 
acknowledgement number. 
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Continuing with the example in Figure 11, we see the segment retransmitted in (2) is 
modified and forwarded to the backup server (4). The ACK segment which the backup 
server responds with is mapped to the primary server to client connection (5). The 
sequence and acknowledgement numbers are converted using the BackupToClientSeq 
and BackupToClientAck formulas. 
 
Figure 11 shows how the response from the backup, the ACK segment (4), because 
MigWare first has to recover the connection. When the client has received the ACK 
segment the client can again start to transfer new data to the server (5). The mapping 
MigWare now does is much faster than the first segment, where the connection has to be 
recovered first. 
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Figure 11: A scenario where the primary server crashes 
 
This figure illustrates the translation of sequence and acknowledgement number between 
two connections. 
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5.3  Modules 
This section contains a more detailed description of the four modules in MigWare. 
The architecture consists of four modules as seen in Figure 7, namely a Sniffer 
module, a Parser module, a Connection Tracker module, and a Monitor module. 
The Sniffer module has the responsibility of detecting all traffic on the local 
network and buffering this traffic in terms of raw packets. The Parser module 
processes the buffered raw packets in order to extract the data fields that are 
relevant for tracking TCP connections. Furthermore, packets that are not related to 
TCP traffic are thrown away for performance reasons. The extracted data fields 
are in turn passed to the Connection Tracker module. The Connection Tracker 
module maintains information about current TCP connections to the Primary 
Server based on the information provided by the Parser module.  In essence, the 
Connection Tracker module identifies which parsed packets belong to which TCP 
connection and updates the tracked state of the respective TCP connections 
accordingly.  Independently of the other modules, the Monitor module monitors the 
Primary Server continuously in order to detect whether the server has crashed. 
When a crash is detected, the other modules are notified, so that they can take 
appropriate recovery actions. 
5.3.1 Monitor implementation 
In order for MigWare to detect a server failure we have implemented a monitor. Because 
this is only a prototype the monitor is relatively simple. It monitors the server for crashes 
through sending a series of ICMP ping packet at a 500ms interval. When the server fails 
to respond to these ping packets, MigWare will make a transition to the Recovery state 
and initiate the recovery procedure. 
 
In a production system one would have several monitors, which would monitor several 
properties and services in order to detect a server crash. It would also be able to detect 
imminent server crashes, and in some cases take pre-emptive measures. 
 
Because both the primary and the backup server are located on the same network node 
(hub/switch), it is sufficient to send ICMP packets to detect server crashes. We have 
discovered that since the packet loss is very low between our two servers, we can say that 
the server has failed already after one ICMP packet fails to give a response. But this 
might have to be adjusted in a production environment. MigWare sends ICMP packets at 
a 500ms interval, and the packets have a 500ms timeout. This gives us a 500-1000ms 
delay before we can detect a server crash. We are also not able to detect anything other 
than server crashes, because this has not been the main focus. Other methods of 
monitoring the health status of a service have been covered elsewhere in the literature 
[41], [42], [43]. 
 
When a server crash is detected by the monitor, all the modules listening will be notified. 
MigWare will also transition into the Recovery state, and initiate the recovery procedure. 
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5.3.2 Sniffer implementation 
The sniffer module has the responsibility of collecting information about all the TCP 
connections running on the local network. Using a library called WinPcap [38] the sniffer 
is able to tap into Ethernet wire and collect all the traffic reaching the network interface. 
Because of different network topologies different methods has to be employed in order 
for all traffic to reach the network interface and the sniffer. All the collected packets are 
buffered, before being processed. 
 
Figure 12: A Hub with bus architecture Figure 13: A switch with star architecture 
 
Figure 12 is an example of two hosts communicating over a bus. A hub is a network 
device based on the bus architecture, where any data transmitted from one host to a 
second host is broadcast to all the hosts connected to the hub, as indicated by the red 
arrows. This means a sniffer on any of the hosts connected to the hub can monitor all 
traffic to and from a second host connected to the hub. 
 
Figure 13 show two hosts communicating over a switch. A switch is based on the star 
architecture, where traffic to a specific host is only transmitted on the port the receiver is 
connected to, as indicated by the red arrows. This means a sniffer on one of the four other 
hosts not participating in the communication cannot monitor the traffic. The network 
traffic would not reach their network adapter. 
  
In order for MigWare to be able to track and recover the TCP connections to the primary 
server, the backup server running MigWare, need to receive the same packets as the 
primary server. An occasional packet might be lost, because of network failure, but we 
have discovered that this is not a significant problem. The amount of packets lost is so 
low it will not affect MigWare’s operation. For a packet loss to affect MigWare’s 
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operation, one of the three segments sent in the three-way handshake has to be lost. We 
have observed the probability for this to happen is very low. 
 
MigWare needs to detect all the packets sent to the primary server. This can be 
accomplished in several ways. The easiest way, and the way we use in our test 
environment, is to use a network hub. A network hub broadcast all the traffic to all the 
ports simultaneous. This enables us to sniff all the packets sent to and from the primary 
server and its clients. This is what we have relied on during the development of the 
prototype. 
 
One other solution to this problem is to use a high end managed switch. Normal switches 
unicast the traffic between the ports. This would create a problem for MigWare, because 
MigWare would not be able monitor the packet stream between the primary server and its 
clients. Almost all high end managed switches has the ability to forward all traffic on one 
port to a second port, thus solving our problem. 
 
A third solution, which we have explored, is to send the packets to a multicast MAC 
address. This solution would demand support for multicast MAC addressing in the 
network switch and by Windows. These features are not supported by Windows, and 
would thus require modifications to the network stack on the client and server. We have 
tried to broadcast the traffic, but it generated too much traffic on all the ports. We do not 
want to overflow the switch. 
 
To get raw access to the Ethernet we use a library called WinPcap. WinPcap is a kernel-
level packet filter, which give us direct network access under windows. This enables us to 
circumvent the TCP/IP stack. This is necessary because we need access to all packets 
detected by the network adapter. Otherwise the TCP/IP stack would filter away some 
packets, and would not give us access to all the information contained in the headers. 
Then MigWare would not be able to replicate an exact copy of the data stream, which is 
necessary when mapping the TCP connection between the primary server and the client, 
to the recovered connection between MigWare and the backup server. 
 
Using normal system primitives, like sockets, one would only have access to the traffic 
intended for the host itself. But because we use WinPcap we are able to set the network 
interface in a promiscuous mode. When the network interface is in promiscuous mode, 
WinPcap is able to sniff all the traffic the network interface detects. And because we use 
a network node with broadcast capability, all traffic to the primary server is now sniffed 
by the WinPcap library running on the backup server. This means all traffic for the 
primary servers port on the hub is also sent to the backup server’s port. 
5.3.3 Parser implementation 
The parser takes the raw data collected by the sniffer and identifies the IP packets. Using 
the information in the packets header fields, the parser can discard all non TCP packets. It 
also look at the IP packets source and destination fields and filter away all packets other 
than the ones addressed to or from the primary server, the clients, and the backup server. 
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The remaining packets are forwarded to the Connection tracker. The information 
contained in the packet headers has been identified by the sniffer, and is also forwarded. 
The parser avoids moving the payload of the packets, thus limiting the load on the CPU. 
MigWare is almost unaffected by the packet size, and it is the number of packets which 
affects the CPU load. 
 
Using the information contained in the packet headers, the Connection tracker can decide 
which connection a packet belongs to. 
5.3.4 Connection tracker implementation 
The Connection tracker uses the TCP/IP header fields to identify which connection a 
packet belongs to. A TCP connection and its packets can be uniquely identified by the 
source address, destination address, source port, and destination port. The Connection 
tracker stores the information from the TCP/IP headers. This information is needed for 
connection recovery. Eventually MigWare will detect a primary server crash, and the 
connection tracker will use the stored information to create a three-way handshake to the 
backup server, recovering the connections to the primary server. 
 
The connection tracker receives packets from the parser. All traffic not related to the 
primary server, backup server or the clients has already been filtered away. The 
connection tracker has to decide what to do with the incoming packet. Initially MigWare 
starts in the Normal state. In the normal state MigWare listens for new connections to the 
primary server, and keeps track of some information needed to recover a connection. This 
information includes the TCP sequence numbers, TCP acknowledgement numbers, IP 
source and destination port numbers, source and destination IP addresses, source and 
destination MAC addresses, and the sequence and acknowledgement number of the last 
segment retransmitted by the client. When this information has been collected, the packet 
is discarded. 
 
Eventually the primary server will crash, and MigWare is notified about this by one of its 
monitors. This triggers the transition to the Recovery state, and the initiation of the 
recovery procedure. All the necessary information about the existing TCP connections 
between the clients and the primary server has been tracked. Using this information we 
can create fake SYN segments to initiate the creation of a new TCP connection between 
MigWare and the backup server. 
 
All packets received while MigWare is in the Recovery state are buffered, and because 
MigWare uses two buffers while in Recovery mode we are able to inspect the packets 
without loosing them. MigWare uses FIFO buffers to improve performance. When 
reading a packet inserted into a FIFO buffer, the packet will be removed from the buffer. 
While in Recovery mode, MigWare needs to inspect the packets looking for incoming 
SYN+ACK segments. This requires the use of one additional FIFO buffer to prevent 
packet loss, inserting all the inspected packets into the second FIFO buffer. All the 
packets inspected while in the Recovery mode need to be forwarded when MigWare 
makes the transition to the Proxy mode. This allows us to detect the proper reception of a 
SYN+ACK segment from the backup server, and respond with a fake ACK segment. 
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Figure 14: A scenario when MigWare cannot detect packets 
 
Figure 14 show a possible solution for establishing a recovered connection between 
MigWare and the replicated service on the backup server. This solution is used by many 
similar solutions, as mentioned in chapter, but does not work when using a middleware 
solution 
 
When MigWare is in the Recovery state, it establishes a connection to the backup server. 
Figure 14 shows an example where MigWare is running on the backup server and 
sending the SYN segment from MigWare to the backup (1). This segment has the backup 
server as both source and destination address. The source address is the backup server 
because MigWare is running on the backup server, and the destination address is the 
backup server because the packet is intended for the redundant service running on the 
backup server. The network interface will detect that the segment is addressed to the local 
host, and forwards the packet to the TCP/IP stack of the backup (2). The TCP/IP stack 
tries to establish a connection with the application on the backup server (3). When the 
application accepts the connection request (4), the TCP/IP stack tries to send a 
SYN+ACK segment back to the source of the request, as part of the three-way 
handshake. Because the segment’s destination is the backup server, the segment will 
never actually be sent on the wire (5). Instead the segment is forwarded directly to the 
destination port on the local host, by the TCP/IP stack. The SYN segment was generated 
by MigWare and not by a socket, and therefore the segment cannot be received through 
one. MigWare needs to receive all its segments through the sniffer, and the sniffer only 
detects packets actually sent on the wire. This is why MigWare uses a more complicated 
system to communicate with the backup server. 
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A solution to the above problem might be to send the SYN segment to a random host 
other than the backup servers. This would cause the packet to be transmitted on the wire 
and detected by the sniffer. The only problem with this is that the address might already 
be in use.  
 
In order to send a SYN segment MigWare needs the IP address, port number, and the 
MAC address of the destination host. When a computer transmits an IP packet on the 
Ethernet, the IP packet needs to be wrapped in an Ethernet frame. This frame contains the 
source and destination MAC addresses. The Ethernet frame encapsulates the IP packet, 
and transmits the packet between two computers connected to the same local area 
network. Then the TCP/IP stack of the receiver will forward the packet over a different 
network if needed. Initially the MAC addresses of the other hosts on the local area 
network are unknown. If the computer already has transmitted a packet to the destination, 
the MAC address has been saved to the senders ARP cache, and is accessible for later 
use. The problem is when no MAC address for the destination exists in the ARP cache. 
Then the computer needs to perform an ARP request. This means broadcasting a special 
frame requesting the MAC address of a host with a specific IP address. This frame is 
transmitted with a predefined broadcast MAC address as the destination. The host will 
send an ARP reply with the MAC address. The come when the computer tries to transmit 
the packet to the host which does not exist. A MAC address for the destination host does 
not exist in the ARP cache, so an ARP request has to be performed before sending. If the 
IP address does not exist, then there would be no reply to the ARP request, and the sender 
would not have any where to send the packet. Then the packet will never be sent. This is 
the reason why MigWare has to use the solution seen in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15:  A scenario where MigWare recover a connection 
 
We found a solution, enabling us to drop the implementation of at ARP cache injector. In 
stead of sending the segment to a random host, we send the segment to the primary host. 
We have already determined that the primary host is down, so there would not be any 
response. In addition the ARP cache on the backup server contains an entry with the 
MAC address of the primary host. 
 
This solution is shown in Figure 15, and it exploits the fact that the backup server already 
has the MAC address of the primary host in the ARP cache. By pretending that the 
backup server is communicating with the primary server, MigWare can detect the 
communication and modify the packets before transmitting them to the client. 
 
In Figure 15 MigWare start by informing the sniffer of a SYN segment it want to send 
(1). The sniffer sends this segment to the network interface (2). The segment is addressed 
from the primary server which is down, but whose MAC address still exist in the ARP 
cache on the local computer. As before, the network interface will detect that the segment 
is addressed for the local host, and forward it to the TCP/IP stack (3). The TCP/IP stack 
will try to setup a connection with the application (4), and if the application accepts the 
connection (5), the TCP/IP stack will send a SYN+ACK segment to the network interface 
(6). This segment is addressed from the local host to the primary server. The network 
interface will transmit this segment, as it is addressed for the primary host (7). When the 
segment is transmitted, it is also sniffed by the sniffer, and MigWare is informed of the 
SYN+ACK segment (8). Using the information contained in the SYN+ACK segment, 
MigWare is able to construct an ACK segment as a response to the SYN+ACK segment. 
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The primary server is down, and no reply will be sent from this server. MigWare instructs 
the sniffer to send the segment (9). As before, the segment's source address is the primary 
server, but the destination is addressed to the local host. When the sniffer sends the 
segment (10), the network interface determines that the segment is addressed for the local 
host and forwards it to the TCP/IP stack (11). The TCP/IP stack expects this ACK 
segment as a response to the previous SYN+ACK segment, and completes the connection 
setup with the application (12). 
  
This solution has one drawback. While the backup server is running in Recovery or 
Proxy state the primary server cannot be put online again. When the primary server come 
online, the packets sent to the primary server will reach its destination. But because the 
primary server does not know any of the connections anymore, it will reply with a 
segment with the RST flag set. This will abort the TCP connection. 
 
The sending of TCP segments to the primary server address can be detected by MigWare. 
It can respond as if the primary server was running. The backup server acts as if it is 
communicating with the primary server. 
 
When all the connections have been recovered, MigWare transitions to the final state, the 
Proxy state. All communication from the client to the primary server will now be 
detected. The packets will be modified, and sent to the backup server, with the primary 
server as its source. The backup server will respond by sending its packets to the primary 
server. MigWare will detect this traffic, modify it, and send it to the client with he 
primary server as the source.  
 
All the necessary information to modify packets and map them to their connection has 
already been registered by the connection tracker. Both the IP packet, MAC frame and 
the TCP segment need to be modified. The MAC frame needs new source and destination 
addresses. The TCP segment needs new sequence and acknowledgement numbers, source 
and destination port numbers, while the IP segment needs new source and destination IP 
addresses. Finally we need to calculate a new checksum for the modified IP packet. 
 
MigWare only translates the incoming packets, it does not need to keep track of which 
packets have been acknowledged and which have not. In essence, MigWare lets the 
TCP/IP stack take care of the communication as much as possible. MigWare is true to the 
internet philosophy, where the intelligence is supposed to be implemented in the 
computers, while keeping the network nodes as dumb as possible. We regard MigWare as 
a network node, even though it is a middleware running on the backup server. 
5.4  Restrictions 
When the primary server has crashed MigWare will recover the existing connections, but 
any new connection attempts to the primary server will fail. This feature can easily be 
implemented, but was deemed unnecessary in the prototype. 
 
When the primary server has crashed and the backup server running MigWare has taken 
over, the primary server cannot be put online again with the same IP address while 
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MigWare is running in Proxy mode. This would cause all the recovered connections to be 
aborted. The only way to get the primary server online again is to use a controlled 
shutdown of all the connections recovered, and establish new connections to the primary 
server again. At the same time MigWare needs to be restarted. But a controlled shutdown 
would not be as problematic as an uncontrolled one. 
 
It is possible, but unlikely, that the packets sent to the primary server, can get lost on the 
way to the backup server. This is not a problem as long as both primary and backup 
server does not receive the packets, but only when the primary receives them and the 
backup does not. The vulnerable point is the connection establishment. If these packets 
do not reach the backup server, MigWare will not be able to detect new connections. 
Other packets can be lost without causing too much interference with MigWare’s 
operation. We have observed that the amount of packet loss is too low to cause any 
problems for the normal operation, and that the probability the lost packets will be one of 
the connection establishment packets is much lower. 
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6 Experiments 
In this chapter we test the performance and robustness of the MigWare prototype. 
Only the setup and results of the experiments are presented. You will find a 
discussion of the results in the next chapter. The experiment tests are set-up for 
validation of functionality and the measurement of performance. 
6.1  Background 
To test the middleware in a realistic environment, we have tried to create the same 
environment and use the same parameters as in Sense’s SiteCom® Rig system, described 
in section 1.2 Sense Intellifield’s service architecture, which is the motivation of the 
conducted experiments. 
6.2  Experiment setup 
In this section we give a description of the environment where the experiments shall 
be conducted. The research environment, which is simulating a general scenario 
where an error occurs, is detailed in this section. The experiment tests are set-up 
for validation of functionality and the measurement of performance, of the 
MigWare prototype. 
6.2.1 Configuration of the network environment 
Three identical servers are connected to a 10 MBit hub. All the servers use Microsoft 
Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition as operating system. The servers contain the 
following components: Intel® Pentium® 4 CPU 2.80 GHz, with 1.49 GB memory and 
10/100/1000Mbit Broadcom NetXtreme Gigabit Ethernet for hp. 
 
 
Figure 16: Experiment setup 
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6.2.2 Scenario 
The scenario for the experiments is the same as for Sense’s SiteCom® Rig system, seen 
in chapter 1.2  Sense Intellifield’s service architecture. Several drill components push 
their data to one server, through TCP socket connections. The data pushing clients send 
PSH+ACK packets. These packets contain numbers indicating the current status of the 
drill components. For example a drilling device updates the server with its temperature 
once or twice per second. The server only receives data and does not reply with any data, 
only acknowledging received data with ACK packets. 
 
Let us call the three machines in Figure 16 for Machine A, Machine B and Machine C. 
Machine A acts as the client containing a client application pushing data every 500ms per 
connection. Machine B is the primary server that contains a server application receiving 
data from client connections on Machine A. Machine C is the backup server containing a 
replica of the application running on server B and the MigWare Middleware application. 
 
All the machines are connected to a hub. A hub broadcasts incoming messages to all its 
ports. We assume that the machines connected to the hub receive the messages 
simultaneously. If Machine B receives a packet, the assumption is that Machine C 
receives the packet at the same time. 
6.2.3 Simulating Sense SiteCom® Rig traffic 
To create a scenario of normal TCP traffic a socket connection is established between a 
client and a server. The client continuously sends integer values to the server. The server 
does not respond to the client, but prints the numbers on screen. This is a typical PUSH 
scenario where the server only acknowledges received data from the client. This is the 
case at Sense’s SiteCom® Rig. To gather sufficient amount of packet data we assume 
that the client has to send 40 integer values over each connections. This results in about 
80 packets including PSH+ACK and ACK packets. 
 
The client data pusher application on Machine A sends numbers to the data receiver 
application on Machine B. The data receiver prints the data on screen. Initially the client 
data pusher sends 40 numbers through a socket connection to the data receiver. This 
results in 80 packets. These packets have an average packet length of 57 bytes. We have 
chosen to use the short packet length, because it is very close to Sense’s SiteCom® case 
where drill components push digits in real-time to the SiteCom® server. The 80 packets 
sent are categorized as normal TCP traffic and is the basis for measuring the latency of 
TCP (the time it takes to receive and respond to a packet). 
 
When a packet is received at the TCP/IP stack, an acknowledgement is issued to the 
sender. The time from a packet is received to it is acknowledged can be interpreted as the 
latency of TCP. 
6.2.4 Simulating error 
An established TCP connection can in theory be permanent. If a sent packet is 
acknowledged within a certain time, before a timeout is issued, the connection will 
persist. If the sender does not receive an acknowledgement, it retransmits 
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unacknowledged packets. If still no acknowledgement is received, a timeout occurs and 
the connection is broken. Timeouts differ from two to nine minutes [39]. Repeated 
retransmissions may trigger timeouts as well [1]. To break a connection one can 
physically break the link between a client and a server. 
 
We simulate errors as follows. During normal TCP communication between the client, 
Machine A, and the server, Machine B, the MigWare middleware application monitors 
the connection. The replicated backup application, Machine C, is ready to receive 
connection requests (is on stand by). After about 80 packets have been exchanged 
between the client and the server per connection, the network cable to the primary server, 
Machine B, is disconnected.  
 
6.2.5 Performance measurement 
The figure below illustrates normal TCP communication. A client sends a PSH+ACK 
packet containing data and it is acknowledge by the server when received. We measure 
the performance as follows: The time from a PSH+ACK packet is received by the server, 
to the server acknowledges it with an ACK packet. A network interface card (NIC) 
timestamps incoming data (PSH+ACK packets) and outgoing acknowledgement (ACK 
packets). These timestamps can be used to measure the latency of TCP message 
exchange. 
 
 
Figure 17: TCP latency 
 
To measure the performance of the MigWare middleware application, four experiments 
have been executed. 1) How much time TCP use to respond to a received packet (TCP 
latency). 2) The time it takes to recover N connections (Time to recover connections). 3) 
How much time the middleware use to respond to a packet sent from the client (Total 
proxy time). 4) And finally the latency of the middleware during proxy mode (Proxy 
latency). 
6.2.6 Robustness measurement 
The robustness and reliability of the MigWare has to be measured. The functionality of 
MigWare has to be verified. The experiments should verify TCP connections persist even 
if a server failure occurs, and they should be migrated to surviving backup servers, 
completely transparent to the clients. 
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We conduct the experiments by checking how many connections are active before we 
simulate error; see the simulating error chapter above for more details, and how many 
connections are active after a recovery. If no connections break before or after a recovery 
is initiated, the robustness test is evaluated as successful because no errors have occurred. 
The robustness test shall be tested on the prototype handling one to 200 TCP connections 
at the same time. 
6.3  Experiment results 
In this section we present the results of conducted experiments to measure the 
performance and robustness. The experiment tests are set-up for validation of 
functionality and the measurement of performance, of the MigWare prototype. The 
experiment setup is described in the previous section, but how the experiments are 
conducted and the results are presented in the following subsections. At the end of 
this section, a summary of the results is listed and illustrated in section 6.3.6. A 
discussion of the results is available in chapter 7. 
6.3.1 TCP latency 
To capture the added latency of the middleware, one must measure the time it takes to 
detect a packet and respond to it during proxy mode. Proxy mode is when the middleware 
is in the state where it detects packets intended for the downed primary server, and 
forwards those packets to the backup server. It is therefore important to know the latency 
of normal TCP traffic, which will be measured in this subchapter. To measure the latency 
of TCP we measure the time it takes for a PSH+ACK packet, t0 in Figure 18, to be 
acknowledged by the server with an ACK packet, t1 in Figure 18. The MigWare 
middleware application read packets from the network in promiscuous and stores the 
timestamps of the packets. We calculate the TCP latency by subtracting the timestamp of 
the ACK with the timestamp of the PSH+ACK, as seen in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 18: Time horizon for acknowledging TCP packets 
 
One thing that has not been tested is an increased packet payload. The packets sent during 
our experiments have had an average packet length of 57 bytes. TCP packets can have a 
packet length up to 1460 bytes due to the restrictions of their transmission medium (in 
this case Ethernet). The reason why we did not test heavier payload is that the 
middleware does not use or inspect data. Only the first 50 bytes are of interest. Another 
reason is that small payload is close to Sense’s case, described in chapter 1.2 Sense 
Intellifield’s service architecture. 
 
As mentioned the payload of a packet can be a possible parameter for testing the 
efficiency of the middleware, but was discarded due its distance from Sense’s case. 
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Another parameter is packets per second. According to Sense’s case, each drill 
component pushes data once or twice per second. Therefore we have taken no interest in 
increasing the number of packets sent per connection (the client sends two packet per 
second). Instead we increase the number of connections which again increases the 
number of packets sent per second.  
 
For one connection, four packets are sent per second, two in each direction. Two 
PSH+ACK packets sent by the client and two ACK packets sent by the server. For 200 
connections, about 800 packets are sent per second. As mentioned a packet has an 
average size of 57 bytes in this scenario. This means that 45600 bytes is sent per second 
or 364800 bits per second (365 kbits/s). 
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Figure 19: The time the TCP/IP stack use to respond to a PSH+ACK packet 
 
The graph above illustrates the collected data. The X-axis represents the number of active 
client connections to the server. The connections are normal TCP socket connections. 
The clients send PSH+ACK data packets and the server responds with ACK packets. The 
Y-axis represents the number of milliseconds it takes before a PSH+ACK packet is 
responded to by an ACK packet. Each Y-value represents the average time between a 
PSH+ACK packet is responded to with an ACK packet per connection. The average is 
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calculated based on each connection sending about 40 PSH+ACK packets and 40 ACK 
packets. 
 
The average time of all the connections was 175 milliseconds. The highest average time 
is 182 milliseconds and is observed at 10 connections. The lowest average time is 158 
and is observed at 150 connections.  Our observation is that the TCP latency is just below 
200 milliseconds and is almost constant. 
 
The time measurement executed in this experiment is quite accurate, because network 
interface card timestamps received packets. One just has to subtract one UNIX time 
stamp from another. Both timestamps are created by the same clock. The time measure 
accuracy is not affected by CPU load. 
6.3.2 Time to recover connections 
As remember from chapter 5.3.1 Monitor implementation, that if the monitor system in 
MigWare fails to ping the primary server, an alarm is sounded and the recovery of the 
active connections is initiated. The monitor system pings the primary server once per 500 
milliseconds. 
 
When recovery is initiated, all the active connections have to be migrated to the backup 
server. The figure below illustrates the procedure. To recover a connection, a new one 
has to be created with the backup server. (1) MigWare sends SYN packets to the replica 
server application on the backup server, pretending that the crashed primary server is the 
client. (2) The server application responds through the TCP/IP stack with SYN+ACK 
packets. (3) The backup server must acknowledge these packets with ACK packets. (P) 
The client does not know of these events and keeps sending packets. When the 
handshakes are complete and all the connections are established, the recovery is 
complete. (P) The MigWare detects the client’s packet, rewrites it and forwards it to the 
backup server. A recovery is initiated when a ping fails and is complete when a new 
connection is established for each existing connection to the primary server. 
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Figure 20: Recovery of one connection 
 
The figure above illustrates a recovery. When the MigWare detects that the primary 
server is crashed, a new handshake is initiated with the backup server. The time it takes to 
go through (1), (2), and (3) for each connection is the recovery time. After the recovery 
packets can be forwarded to the backup server. A measurement of the recovery 
performance is presented in the following graph: 
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Figure 21: The time MigWare use to recover connections 
 
The highest average recovery time is 680 milliseconds for 200 connections and the 
lowest average recovery time is 207 milliseconds for 100 connections. The total average 
recovery time for all the connections is 456 milliseconds, about half a second. 
 
There is a broad variance between the recovery time and the number of connections. We 
will come back to this in the next chapter. 
6.3.3 Total proxy time 
To be able to measure the overall latency of the MigWare middleware application, one 
can measure the time it takes for the system to respond to packets sent from clients. This 
measurement follows the same principles as the measurement of the TCP latency.  
 
The middleware solutions packet rewriting procedure is described in the figure below. 
The middleware sniffs packets in promiscuous mode in the sub network. A hub connects 
the machines and broadcasts packets. (1) During proxy mode, the connection tracker 
component detects a packet sent form the client intended for the primary server. (2) 
MigWare rewrites the packet and sends it to backup server pretending that the crashed 
server is the source. (3) The TCP/IP stack acknowledges the received packet. (4) 
MigWare detects that packet on the network and rewrites it and sends it to the client, 
pretending that it is the primary server who acknowledges the sent packet. 
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Figure 22: MigWare's message exchange 
 
The time it takes for MigWare to detect a PSH+ACK packet from a client (1), to the 
MigWare responds to it with an ACK packet (4) is the variable in this experiment. With 
these results, one can measure the latency of the middleware by subtracting the total 
proxy time with the TCP latency. We will come back to this later in this chapter. 
 
For now we will measure the total time from the client sends a packet, t0 in , to it receives 
an acknowledge from the backup server through MigWare, t4 in, still believing that the 
response comes from the primary server.  
 
 
Figure 23: The total time horizon for the MigWare in proxy mode 
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Figure 24: The time the MigWare use to rewrite and forward packets 
 
The highest average total time is 1055 milliseconds when handling 200 connections and 
the lowest average time is 523 milliseconds when handling 10 connections. The average 
total time for all connections is 787 milliseconds, or ¾ of a second. 
6.3.4 Proxy latency 
This experiment measures the latency of the MigWare Middleware application. The 
latency represents the time delay added to normal TCP traffic. To find the delay, one 
must use the following equation: 
 
‘Proxy latency’ = ‘Proxy total time’ – ‘TCP latency’ 
 
 
Figure 25: The time horizon for the MigWare in proxy mode 
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‘Proxy latency’ = (t1 to t4) – ((t1, t2) + (t3, t4)) 
 
The equation is illustrated in the figure above. The client sends a PSH+ACK packet 
intended for the primary server; t0 to t1 in Figure 25, not knowing it has crashed. The 
middleware detects the packet, rewrites it and forwards it to the backup, t1 to t2 in Figure 
25. The backup server responds to the received packet by acknowledging, t2 to t3 in 
Figure 25. The middleware detects the packet again, rewrites it and forwards it to the 
backup, t3 to t4 in Figure 25. 
 
The proxy latency illustrates the time added due to the middleware’s overhead and can be 
seen in Figure 25 as t1 to t2 and t3 to t4. 
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Figure 26: the latency of the MigWare Middleware Application 
 
The highest average value is 893 milliseconds at 200 connections and the lowest value is 
396 milliseconds at 20 connections. The total average latency for all connections is 612 
milliseconds, just above half a second. 
6.3.5 Robustness test 
No connections broke before or after the error simulation. No errors have been detected 
during the simulation of Sense’s SiteCom® Rig traffic, during connection recovery, or 
during proxy mode. 
 58
6.3.6 Summary 
This is a summary of all the conducted experiments represented in the same graph in the 
same scale. 
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Figure 27: The experiment results 
 
The total average recovery time for all the connections is 456 milliseconds, about half a 
second. The average total time for all connections is 787 milliseconds, or ¾ of a second. 
The average time of all the connections was 175 milliseconds, just below 200 
milliseconds. The total average middleware latency for all connections is 612 
milliseconds. No errors occurred during the experiments. 
 59
7 Discussion 
In section 7.2 we present a discussion of the experiment results in chapter 6, and in 
section 7.3  we compare our prototype to similar existing one. In section 7.4 critical 
remarks to the experiments and the results is addressed. In chapter 7.4 we present a 
recomandation for further work. 
7.1  Introduction 
This section discusses the experiment results and compares the MigWare middleware 
application to Jeebs, due to the similarity of the two solutions [39].  Both migrates TCP 
connections without modifying the client or server application. The difference in Jeebs 
and MigWare is that Jeebs has to make changes to the backup server’s kernel by 
modifying the TCP/IP stack. MigWare does not make any changes to any operating 
systems, kernels, daemons, TCP/IP stacks or applications. The MigWare middleware and 
WinPcap has to be installed on the backup server. Therefore, MigWare is an add-on 
solution. 
 
A comparison between the two solutions will present their strength and weaknesses. At 
the end of this chapter, a recommendation for when to use which solution is available.  
7.2  Experiment results 
In chapter 6, four experiments were conducted; Time to recover connections in section 
6.3.2, Total proxy time in section 6.3.3, TCP latency in section 6.3.1, and Proxy 
latency in section 6.3.4. Only two of the experiments will be discussed because they are 
the most relevant. The total proxy time and the TCP latency are conducted to calculate 
the proxy latency. 
7.2.1 Time to recover connections 
The average recovery time for all connections is 456 milliseconds, just below half a 
second. Comparing this with the Jeebs system, this is a dramatically improvement [39]. 
Jeebs has an average recovery time of 120000 milliseconds (2 minutes) for 100 
connections. MigWare has an average recovery time of 207 milliseconds (1/5 of a 
second) for 100 connections. 
 
The results vary. A probable reason is that the accuracy of the measurements is not 
adequate. We have used the computer’s clock to capture the time of recovery initiation 
and finalization (The C# static DateTime.Now object). During heavy CPU load the 
time retrieval might be delayed, in contrary to the use of UNIX timestamps. Another 
reason is the use of threads without thread pooling. However we can say that the recovery 
time is below 678 milliseconds, because the maximum recovery time is 678 for 200 
connections which is the maximum number of connections. The rest is below 678 
milliseconds. 
 
Why is there such a big difference in the results? One reason might be the architecture. 
The Jeebs’s monitor is much more advanced; monitoring several services instead of just 
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pinging the server to detect if it has crashed or not. It takes much more time to verify that 
a single service has crashed than checking if a ping succeeds or not. MigWare has a much 
simpler monitoring system than Jeebs and has therefore less latency. One of MigWare’s 
weaknesses is that if a service fails on the server, but not the server itself, than MigWare 
will not migrate any connections. MigWare is the most efficient recovery system if the 
server accidentally crash or is disconnected. 
 
Another reason why Jeebs cannot match MigWare in recovery time is that Jeebs stores 
state information and critical packets in a database on a black box monitor [39]. During a 
recovery, Jeebs has to play back all the packets in the same order to recover a connection 
and its state. This adds more latency. 
7.2.2 Proxy latency 
When a recovery has been issued, the middleware rewrites packets to “fool” the TCP 
protocol to prevent the connections to break/time-out. The time it takes to detect a packet 
sent from the client to the primary server, and to send a reply from the backup server to 
the client is measured. This time measurement can be used to calculate the latency added 
by the middleware. 
 
The total average latency for all connections is 612 milliseconds, just above half a 
second. This is severe penalty comparing it to the latency of normal TCP latency which is 
below 200 milliseconds, according to our measurements. The MigWare adds on average 
612 milliseconds in latency to the TCP protocol. 
 
The time measurement executed in this experiment is quite accurate in contrary to the 
recovery time measurement, because the network interface card timestamps received 
packets. One just has to subtract one UNIX time stamp from another. Both timestamps 
are created by the same clock. 
 
Comparing this to Jeebs, who has made changes to the kernel by modifying the TCP/IP 
stack, the MigWare latency is enormous. Once Jeebs has recovered a connection, no 
latency is added to the TCP. 
7.2.3 Robustness testing 
No errors are detected during the experiment runs. This does not prove the real 
robustness of the prototype, but it does not falsify the claim that MigWare is robust and 
reliable. 
 
If no TCP connections break before or after a server failure, one can conclude that the 
failure is masked and that the clients do not detect the failure. If this is the case, this is an 
evidence of the added robustness to TCP by using the MigWare middleware. The 
functionality of MigWare has been verified. TCP connections persist even if a server 
failure occurs. The connection is simply migrated to a surviving backup server, 
completely transparent to the clients. 
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Further robustness testing could have been applied to validate the logic of the prototype. 
The robustness tests conducted are quite simple and do not prove that the prototype is 
flawless, but it shows robustness to some extent. 
7.3  When to use Jeebs and MigWare 
Jeebs and MigWare are two different solutions to the same problem. Both are intended to 
increase the availability of TCP-based services and to mask failure. The two solutions 
have quite different performance. 
 
Jeebs recovers states and completely migrate connections without adding any latency to 
the TCP. The penalty is that there has to be made changes to the operating system of the 
backup server, forcing the backup server to run on Linux. For Sense who runs Microsoft 
.Net applications that are dependant of the Windows operating system, it is impossible to 
adapt to this solution. For more general purposes, Jeebs is superb, recovering the states of 
TCP-services without adding any latency to the TCP. 
 
MigWare offers an add-on solution providing fast recovery without modifying any 
existing operating system, kernel, TCP/IP stack, daemon or applications. The cost of the 
solution is added latency to the TCP due to the packet rewriting and forwarding. If this is 
the case, like in Sense’s case, or there is a need for fast recovery, this is the way to go. 
The prototype is developed with .Net to run on the Windows platform, but it can be 
developed platform independent as well. The MigWare prototype does not support 
application state recovery, but it has not ruled it out. 
 
When it comes to a comparison of robustness, we come up short. Jeebs presented no 
robustness data or robustness experiment for comparison. Jeebs has proven to migrate 
120 connections without failure, while MigWare has successfully migrated 200 
connections. With success, we mean that no errors were reported during experiments. 
7.4  Further work 
The performance of the prototype is adequate, but can be improved. Efficient use of 
threads and pointers can improve the performance. Instead of using WinPcap to sniff 
packets in promiscuous mode, miniport drivers can be developed to improve the 
efficiency. Keep in mind that this is a prototype demonstrating the concept of middleware 
connection migration. 
 
The middleware solution can be developed platform independent, using for example C++ 
or Java. MigWare is developed in C# .Net so it could be adopted by Sense who runs 
everything on the Windows platform. The prototype is developed for the Microsoft 
Windows platform, but the technique and architecture is platform independent. 
  
There has been no use of formal methods to verify the prototype. It can verify the 
prototype’s algorithms and provide quality assurance. 
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7.5  Critcal remarks 
Are the results well-founded? The results are well-founded due to the simulation of a real 
case, the SiteCom® Rig system. This case is also quite common in the IT-industry. The 
experiments conducted are very close to the simulated reality.  
 
Are the results general? The results are general because of the simulation of a common 
push case. One can critique the results because it lacks variance of the packet lengths. 
However, several PUSH cases do not send large amount of data.  
 
Are the results useful? The results are useful, because they give an accurate indication of 
the performance of an application level middleware solution. The results can be used to 
decide whether or not to implement this solution to increase the availability of TCP-based 
services 
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8 Conclusion 
Until TCP-based migration solutions are available on the hundreds of millions of 
existing systems, there will remain a need for client-transparent migration. The 
MigWare middleware system demonstrates how our technique can be deployed in a 
simple manner, without requiring changes to existing site architecture. The 
simplicity and immediate applicability of the technique proposed in this report make 
it attractive for adoption in a number of cases.  
 
Results 
Empirical data show that a middleware for TCP connection migration is possible and 
feasible. This is demonstrated by the MigWare prototype which migrate TCP connections 
from a primary server to a backup server without the client ever knowing about it. The 
primary server was disconnected from the network while active connections were 
processing real-time data. All the connections were migrated to the backup server 
containing a replica of the TCP-based service on the primary server, completely 
transparent to the clients. 
 
The middleware is simply installed on a backup server where it monitors the connections 
to the primary server. No modifications to the operating systems, TCP/IP stacks, kernels, 
client application or server application is needed. MigWare is true to the internet 
philosophy, where the intelligence is supposed to be implemented in the computers, while 
keeping the network nodes as dumb as possible. We regard MigWare as a network node, 
even though it is a middleware running on the backup server. 
 
No errors were detected during the experiments and no connections broke before or after 
a recovery. Empirical data verifies the functionality of the prototype. The prototype 
proves to add robustness to TCP by detecting server failure and migrate connections, 
completely transparent to the client. The time to migrate active connections from a 
crashed server to a backup server is satisfactory. The result is better than similar 
solutions, using only 456 milliseconds in average to recover up to 200 connections. The 
performance of the prototype is adequate, adding a latency of 612 milliseconds in average 
and handling up to 200 connections simultaneous.  
 
Consequences 
MigWare can replace expensive third-party load balancers and clustering solutions that 
ensure high availability of TCP-based services. In addition MigWare adds robustness to 
TCP and, unlike many third-party solutions, connections persists when servers fail. This 
can give companies economical advantages by not being dependant of expensive, 
limiting, and existing third-party solutions. 
 
Further work 
No attempts to migrate application states were discussed or researched, and no effort was 
issued to reduce the latency or overhead of the prototype. However, there are many cases 
that do not need to include state migration, like Sense’s SiteCom® Rig system. Simple 
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measures can be taken to improve the performance; like thread pooling, miniport driver 
implementation, and the use of pointers. 
 
Critical Remarks 
The results are well-founded due to the simulation of a real case, the SiteCom® Rig 
system. This case is also quite common in the IT-industry. The experiments conducted 
are very close to the simulated reality. The results are general because of the simulation 
of a common push case. One can critique the results because it lacks variance in the 
packet lengths. However, several PUSH cases do not send large amount of data. The 
results are useful, because they give an accurate indication of the performance of an 
application level middleware solution. The results can be used to decide whether or not to 
implement this solution to increase the availability of TCP-based services. 
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